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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION:
The Internet is a global network connecting millions of people around the world.  More 
than 100 countries are connected through the Internet to access global data exchange. The 
Internet architecture looks like this: (see figure below)
                                           Figure 1: General Internet (reproduced from [1])
 So the Internet serves as the backbone for 80% of the world’s population. Access to the 
Internet is gained through ISPs. The Internet has two types of computers, namely HOSTS 
and CLIENTS. A client is the one which has permanent access to the internet. A client to 
the internet can access the email and upload or download files and World Wide Web. The 
size of the internet is being estimated as 27.5 million people in U.S alone [1].
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As the Internet grows the threat to the Internet also grows at the same pace. There are 
varieties of threats to Internets: worms, viruses, and Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. 
1.1 WORMS:
A Worm is a program that propagates itself and uses the resources of one machine to 
attack other machines. The worms get the host address by system tables.  Worms consist 
of 99 line boot strap program written in C language. The activities of worm are divided 
into attack and defense. In attack mode it will locate a host to penetrate, and it will 
exploit a security hole in order to pass the copy of the worm and run it. The worms will 
penetrate to the remote system also. This is achieved in three ways. It will take the 
advantage of the bug in the finger server that will allow it to download the code as   
finger request and will execute the code by tricking the server. The second method 
involves sending mail through a “trap door” in send mail SMTP mail service. In this way, 
it sends a bug in executing code which will open the command interpreter. Once in the 
command interpreter it will copy and execute the 99 line boot strap. In the third, the 
program guesses one of the local accounts and password and tries to get its remote 
command interpreter; then it copies the code and runs it [2].  Worms will exploit the 
operating system by bugs which make the operating system inadequate to do normal 
processes. On the whole, Worms will shut down the whole network. 
Protecting the network against worm can be done with several tools. There are two types 
of protection, namely basic protection and good network security. One type of basic 
security system is Identification and Authentication. In this, the system will identify the 
control and authenticate only the legitimate controls to the user. Still, worms will attack if 
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it is poorly managed. The other method is Add-on tools. There are three types of add-on 
tools: configuration review tool, check sum–based change detection tool and intrusion 
detection tool. Wrapper programs are types of network security tools which reject or 
allow particular connection. The firewall system is another type of network security [3].
1.2 VIRUSES:
The next threat is viruses. A virus is a program that replicates a code segment by 
attaching copies to existing executables.  The main characteristics of viruses are 
replication, requiring a host program as carrier and activated by external action and 
replication. These are limited to virtual servers. When the computer program is infected 
by viruses, then that program has been converted to a Trojan horse. These programs will 
perform useful functions but they are affected by the side effects of virus programs which 
perform unintended task. In addition to the unintended tasks, these virus programs 
perform replication too. The replication begins when the original program tries to 
execute. The replication of a virus is uncontrollable, which makes a virus so dangerous. 
Viruses are designed to attack a current platform. A platform is the one which is 
combination of hardware and operating system. The operating system should be designed 
for that particular type of hardware. There are two types of viruses, research virus and 
personal computer virus. The research type of virus is the one that is written for research 
or study purposes and is not distributed to the public. The first computer viruses were 
being developed in early 1980s.The first viruses was called APPLE II viruses. All viruses 
are fond of targeting personal computers. Over the years the viruses have evolved due to 
the authors making the code more difficult to detect, dissemble and eradicate. Personal 
computer viruses are those viruses which exploit the controls over these systems. Viruses 
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can modify files in the operating system itself. These actions are considered a legal action 
in the operating system. While more stringent rules are there in the multi-user, multi-task 
operating system due to the loop holes in the configuration and security, it creates the 
possibility of viruses to get in to these types of systems. In conclusion the viruses can 
exploit the operating system controls and human patterns of system use/misuse, 
Destructive viruses are hard to eradicate. Other viruses, which are called innovative 
viruses, will propagate more windows before being discovered. It is been studied that for 
multi-user system it is hard to write viruses. Even though it is hard to write the multi-user 
system viruses there are possibility that viruses can still exist in those systems. The 
reason is that personal computer systems exchange disks frequently. In those set of 
personal computers some may be affected by the viruses which leads to the spread of 
viruses to unaffected systems. In the multi-user systems there exists an administrator 
which does not exchange the executables but exchanges the source code. In those systems 
the probability of viruses attacking is much less. These systems are made for copyrighted 
materials. So they exchange materials with public or local domains. The advent of remote 
protocols like NFS (Network File Systems) and RFS (Remote File Systems) lead to 
formation small multi-user systems which can exchange executables. In order to spread, 
viruses need a set of homogenous systems and executables to exchange software.
Anti-virus software can be used to protect against viruses. These tools should be available 
first whenever there is an exchange of software between the systems. These tools are 
divided in to three categories namely the detection tools, identification tools and removal 
tools. Examples of detectors are Scanners, modification programs and vulnerability 
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monitors. Scanners serve as identification tools also. Examples of removal tools are 
disinfectors.
Scanners and disinfectors rely on the a priori knowledge in the viral code. Scanners will 
try to find the signature codes or some types of algorithms to detect or identify the 
existence of known viruses. Where as the disinfectors will look for the size of viruses and 
type of modifications to restore them. Vulnerability monitors are those that prevent 
accessibility of viruses to the sensitive parts of the computer. This requires lot of 
information about the system use. Modification programs are those which do not require 
any information about viruses. In this technique the check sum information about the 
clean executables are executed and saved. For each other computation the executables 
check sum are compared with the original one [4].
1.3 DoS ATTACK:
 DoS attack are considered the major threat to the Internet. DoS attack is the 
concentration of forged traffic in the targeted servers. In DoS attacks useless packets are 
being sent to the targeted victim, so that the victim gets a multitude of packets which 
bring the system to halt. Technically the attacker will be sending a large number of
requests which may overwhelm the server denying access to legitimate users. These 
attacks spread through the world by using many computers which take over those 
networks by hacking. In 2000 DoS attack brought a number of popular sites namely 
google.com, yahoo.com and hotmail.com to halt. About two to three percent of traffic is 
by targeted servers; the router used to send to the proper domain name sends to the 
equivalent address leading to flooding of network. Routers, that direct the traffic, get a 
DoS attack about 1 to 2 percent. Most important sites like Amazon.com, Aol.com are 
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targets of DoS attacks. The study about this attack gives the idea that the majority of 
victims (i.e. 95 % of them) are attacked lesser than 5 times and 65%of the victims are 
attacked only one time [4].   The interesting thing about the DoS attack is that the attacker 
will try to spoof the victim by giving spoofed source IP address to the victim. These types 
of attacks are called hidden attacks, since the attacker will be behind scene and send 
packets to the victim.
Such attacks are considered to be hardest among the security problem because they are 
easy to carry out and hard to prevent. In recent years Internet denial of service attacks has 
increased in frequency, severity and sophistication. DoS are of two type single source 
Denial of service attacks and distributed source denial of service attacks. In single source 
only one machine generates packets to the victim where as in distributed DoS, several 
machine generates packets to the victim. The figure 2 below shows the DDoS attack [8].
                           
                                                   Figure 2: DDoS attack (reproduced from [8])
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 Some of the common varieties of Denial of service attacks are 
a) Syn Flood,
b) ICMP flood, 
c) UDP flood, 
d) Application Level floods, and
 e) Nukes.
1.3.1 SYN FLOOD:
A SYN flood is a sequence of TCP session initiation packets, often from incorrect (or 
“spoofed”) IP addresses. The result is that the target tries and fails to establish a number 
of TCP sessions, which consumes resources on the target [14]. The figure 3 shows the 
model of the SYN attack [5].In this; attacker with IP address 201.10.24.6 sends a SYN 
packet with the spoofed source address 245.20.26.80. As a result the Net screen device 
will respond for the SYN request by sending SYN/ACK packets to the spoofed source IP 
address and waits for a response until the response until the efforts bines out.
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                                                 Figure 3: SYN Attack (reproduced from [5])
In SYN flood the attacker will send large amount of SYN request to the server and the 
server will send ACK to the SYN request. But the attacker will not be responding to 
those requests so this result in the half open connections in the server. Incoming 
connections will be still in the handshake phase which is part of the backlog queue. But 
the backlog queue is really small once these requests start to come in this queue will get 
full which leads to the half open connection [6]. The attacker will send those SYN 
request till the server comes to the half connection open. After that the server cannot 
respond to the new request [17]. If this continues then it halts the entire system. If the 
target is going to be a SMTP server then legitimate users may not receive any email or if 
the target is HTTP server then the website will be down.
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1.3.2 ICMP FLOOD:
An ICMP flood is another attack mechanism wherein a sequence of ICMP echo request 
packets from spoofed IP addresses is sent to a server. Echo requests are usually answered 
by an echo reply packet if the target is operational, so such an attack will consume 
resources on the target. This attack will also consume resources on the spoofed source IP 
addresses as they will receive a number of ICMP echo replies [16].An example of this 
attack is that in the figure 4 shown below [7]. In this the attacker sends the spoofed ICMP 
request to IP addresses 192.168.1.255 and 10.1.2.255. This in turn sends those requests to 
the victim. As a result the system hangs [7]. There are actually three players in this attack 
namely the attacker, the intermediary victim and the victim. The attacker sends the 
request with spoofing its IP address as IP address of intermediary network address. As a 
result the intermediary network replies to those requests which cause the victim flooding 
[7].
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                                                        Figure 4: ICMP attack (reproduced from [7])
1.3.3 UDP FLOOD:
The same idea is used in a UDP flood where a sequence of UDP packets, often from 
spoofed IP addresses, is sent to UDP ports. Smurf and Fraggle attacks exploit the fact that 
a source IP address sending an ICMP or UDP flood will be flooded with reply traffic, by 
flooding the broadcast address of a target network with ICMP or UDP packets [16].UDP 
is a type of protocol which does not use any hand shake signals. So this makes the 
attacker to easily abuse victim. One common type of attack in UDP is called as “Pepsi 
attack.” In this attack the attacker sends large number of forged UDP packets to the 
random diagnostic port on the target host. The CPU time, resource and the bandwidth 
11
required for processing these packets makes the network unavailable for providing access 
to the legitimate users [9]. 
1.3.4 APPLICATION LEVEL FLOOD:
An application Level flood is the flooding of various applications. The common 
application level flood is multiple requests to a particular web server and sending large 
email attachments to the victim [16].The main target of application level flood is to 
disable and damage application process. These attacks can be identified by deep packet 
filtering. Also these attacks cannot be identified by layer 3-4 parameters since these 
attacks uses legitimate parameters and performs malicious functions [10].
1.3.5 Nukes:
Nukes are a method of crashing out the remote systems. A common example of a Nuke 
attack is the IP packet with same source and destination address [16]. Nukes will exploit 
bugs in the operating system (OS). The main idea of nukes is to send packets to OS such 
that, the OS may not be able to recognize those packets. In this attack the attacker will 
send message stating that particular system had dropped the connection with the server, 
so the server will drop that particular connection. But the victim has not sent those 
messages. So the result is that the particular victim will be disconnected with the server. 
These attacks are carried out mainly to crash windows 32/95/NT systems. Technically 
this attack carried out by sending OOB (Out Of Band) used to establish connection with 
the windows user.Net bios is effective in this attack, whichever port listens to that data 
can be attacked.Net bios is used as communication link between computer hardware and 
network hardware. When it receives OOB data, it asks the computer hardware, which one 
wants the OOB data but the OOB data is been faked by the attacker. As a result of this all 
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the hardware will respond as “I don’t know.” In the mean time computer says it could not 
respond, leading the computer to hang. Tear drop attack and smurf attack are types of 
Nuke attacks.
Tear Drop attack is the one that happens when TCP/IP protocols handle data larger than 
1024 bytes. TCP/IP protocol handles these large amounts of data by dividing them into 
fragments and putting an offset number at the beginning of the packet. At the receiving 
side the receiver must reassemble these fragments in order to get the whole data. So in 
this attack, the attacker puts a confusing offset number. For the receiver, if there is no 
plan to handle this situation the system will crash [11].
Smurf Attack is the one in which the attacker sends ping requests to a receiving site. 
These ping requests represent it have to be broadcasted to all of the local networks sites. 
Also this request will represent that it is from some spoofed host. As a result the spoof 
will receive lot of replies flooding the innocent host [11].
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
This chapter is to give some of the background information about the packet marking and 
trace back scheme. In this chapter we are going to study about various kinds of other 
methods carried out by others, what are all drawbacks with those schemes and why we 
need to go for the new scheme.
2.1 TRACE BACK:
In order to trace the attacker from all attacks mentioned in the previous chapter IP trace 
back scheme is used. IP trace back in general is defined as the method of tracing back the 
path traversed by packets using the IP header from source to destination, where the 
source is the attacker and destination is the victim. The trace back process from an 
attacker to victim is shown in the figure [12].In this, attacker is traversing the path 
Router3, Router5 and Router6.So the path is traced back in order to find out the attacker. 
                              
                               Figure5: IP trace back (reproduced from [12])
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The trace back process is carried out in the network layer with the help of routers and 
gateways. The challenge in IP trace back processes is to find a scalable and efficient way 
to track the source of the arbitrary IP packet [17].  Another objective of IP trace back is to 
minimize router overload and the time required to get the trace [17].To carry out IP trace 
back we need to mark the illegitimate packets that are passing through the routers. IP 
marking is the technique used to get the information of the router through which the 
packet had passed through the network. All the routers are enabled with some marking 
technique by which, if a router decides to mark a packet it gives its IP information to the 
destination router through the packet. When the victim receives a sufficient number of 
packets, it traces the path traversed by the packet from the attacker to the victim.
2.2 NODE APPENDING, NODE SAMPLING AND EDGE SAMPLING:
 Savage et. al.  in ref [17] discussed three basic marking scheme namely node appending, 
node sampling and edge sampling. In Node Appending, a router’s address is appended to 
a packet traveling through the network from the attacker to the victim. At the victim side 
the packet carries all the routers address with that it gets the trace. The main draw back of 
node appending is Router over load that happens when appending the IP address during 
packet marking. Also, since the length of the path is not known a priori, it is impossible 
to use all the unused space in the packet for the complete list. This leads to unwanted 
fragmentation of packets and bad interaction with the services. 
In node sampling on receiving a packet the router chooses to write its address with some 
probability. So by receiving certain number of packets the victim can get its trace. The 
main draw back of node sampling is the routers that are far away from the victim 
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contribute only few samples for path construction. Interfacing the total router order from 
the distribution of samples is a slow process. This technique is not robust against multiple 
attacks.
The third scheme that is proposed is called as Edge sampling. In Edge sampling two 
static address fields “start” and “end” and a distance field are reserved. Whenever a 
router R decides to mark the packet, it writes its own address in the start field and marks 
the distance field as zero. Otherwise if the distance field is already zero then this shows 
that some other router R1 had already marked the packet. Hence in this case router R 
writes its own address in the end field. The distance field is incremented in each hop as 
long as packet is forwarded in the network. The main draw back of edge sampling is that 
it requires larger IP packet header sizes; there by it is not backward compatible. 
Consequently less information is available for the path reconstruction.
2.3 PROBABILISTIC PACKET MARKING:
 Park et. al. in ref [18] discussed the probabilistic packet marking. Probabilistic packet 
marking is the method in which the packet is marked based on some probability called 
the marking probability. In probabilistic packet marking packets are chosen randomly 
with low marking probability for example 1/25. So the packets that are marked are a 
subset of total traffic.  Each router will calculate a marking probability by which the 
router takes a decision to mark the packet or not. If the router decides to mark the packet 
it writes its IP address to the packet and forwards the packet. The simple model of 
probabilistic packet marking is shown in the figure 5 [19].In this, attacker is source x. 
Which takes the attack path R1, R2 and R3.All the routers in the attack path will mark the 
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packet with some marking probability. With the marked packets the victim gets the 
attacker information. 
                                          Figure 6: Probabilistic Packet Marking (reproduced from [15])
In probabilistic packet marking, two methods are carried out namely packet marking and 
path reconstruction. Packet marking is done by the method said above and the packet 
information are stored and handled by edge sampling method. The marked packets are 
used for the path reconstruction. The main draw back of probabilistic packet marking is 
the number of packets required for reconstruction is more. The reason is ppm uses 
underutilized space in IP packets to send information which is not enough to get 
information. So we need more packets to get entire path.  
2.4 DETERMINISTIC PACKET MARKING:
 Belenky et. al. in ref [7] discussed about the deterministic packet marking .In 
deterministic packet marking all the packet that enters the network is been marked (i.e.
R
R R
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whenever a packet enters the network the packet is marked by the ingress router1  and the 
marking remain unchanged as long as the packet stays in the network). The model for 
Deterministic Packet Marking is shown in figure 6 below
                                    Figure 7: Deterministic Packet Marking (reproduced from [17])
There are only 17 bits available for carrying the marked information. So the marked 
information is carried in a field of17 bits. The 32 bit marked information is split into two 
parts of each 16 bits, we use the 16 bit for the address and one bit to represent which part 
of the address (i.e.) if the flag field is ‘0’ then it is first half or if it is ‘1’ then it is second 
half. Hence the marked information is carried through two packets. The main draw back 
of Deterministic packet marking is packet overhead. This technique requires two packets 
to get the information of one router; it doubles the number of packets required for the 
                                                
1 Ingress router is the router through which the packet enters the network.
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victim to get the attacker information. Also as we have the reserved flag for getting which 
part of the IP address, there is a very good chance of getting the wrong IP address.
2.5 DISTRIBUTED LINK LIST MARKING:
Duwairi et. al. in ref [8] discussed the distributed link list (DLL) concept. The basic idea 
behind DLL is “store, mark and forward.” Each packet has a single marking field. 
Whenever the router decides to mark the packet it stores the current IP address along with 
packet id in the marking field to the special data structure called the marking table. Then 
it writes its IP address to the marking field and forwards the packet.  Link list is 
inherently implemented since the marking table in each router has the pointer to the 
previous router. The marking strategy carried out in this method is that when ever a 
router marks a packet, it tries to enforce the subsequent router to mark the same packet; 
there exists a marking flag in the packet if the flag is on then the next router 
deterministically marks the packet and resets the flag. The next router along the way then 
marks the packet in a probabilistic fashion. The main draw back of DLL is router 
overhead. More routers store the packet information. This happens if high marking 
probability is used. In order to reduce router head, the marking probability is decreased. 
Then the time taken to get the trace is high.
19
2.6 PROBABILISTIC PIPELINED PACKET MARKING:
 Basheer et. al. in ref [9] discussed with Probabilistic pipelined packet marking .The main 
aim of this research is to reduce the number of packets required for the trace back 
process. The idea in this research is that the marking information is sent through the 
subsequent packets heading to the same destination. In this approach each of the 
pipelined probabilistic packet marking enabled router has a buffer of its own. The 
marking strategy carried out is that, when ever router decides to mark a packet it stores 
the packet information into its buffer and rewrites the packet information. For example let 
three routers be R1, R2, and R3 with the attacker being R1 and the victim being R3. We 
assume that all the routers mark the packet. When packet p1 reaches router R1 it marks 
the packet and stores the old information into its buffer when the packet p1 reaches R2, 
R2 will mark the packet and stores R1 information to its buffer. At last the victim R3 will 
get R2 information through packet p1.When packet p2 is also heading to same destination 
as p1 does, p2 is not marked by any of the router but p2 is used to carry information of 
the marked packet. When p2 reaches R3 it has information of R1, so the victim can get 
all the path information. The main draw back of pipelined probabilistic packet marking is 
constant marking probability. When the marking probability is kept as constant two 
things happen. If the marking probability is high then router overhead is high. If the 
marking probability is low then the time required to get the trace is high.
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CHAPTER 3: PROPOSED SCHEME
The imminent threats imposed by the Internet Denial of Service attacks imply that there 
is need for fast and efficient trace back scheme. A good trace back scheme should have 
the following features [9]
1. Recognition and exclusion of false information injected by the attacker;
2. Avoiding the use of large amount of packets to construct the trace back path;
3. Low processing and storage overhead at the intermediate routers;
4. If the packet information is stored at the intermediate routers then collecting this 
information must be efficient.
In order to achieve the above, a new approach called “Hop count Sensitive marking 
probability in Probabilistic packet marking” is proposed.
3.1 DRAW BACK WITH EXISTING SCHEMES:
The main draw back of node appending is Router over load that happens when appending 
the IP address during packet marking. Also, since the length of the path is not known a 
priori, it is impossible to use all the unused space in the packet for the complete list. This 
leads to unwanted fragmentation of packets and bad interaction with the services. The 
main draw back of probabilistic packet marking is the number of packets required for 
reconstruction is more. The reason is ppm uses underutilized space in IP packets to send 
information which is not enough to get information. So we need more packets to get the
entire path. The main draw back of Deterministic packet marking is packet overhead. 
This technique requires two packets to get the information of one router it doubles the
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number of packets required for the victim to get the attacker information. Also as we 
have the reserved flag for getting which part of the IP address, there is a very good 
chance of getting the wrong IP address. The main draw back of DLL is router overhead. 
More routers store the packet information. This happens if high marking probability is 
used. In order to reduce router head if the marking probability is decreased. Then the time 
taken to get the trace is high. The main draw back of pipelined probabilistic packet 
marking is constant marking probability. When the marking probability is kept as 
constant two things happen. If the marking probability is high then router overhead is 
high. If the marking probability is low then the time required to get the trace is high. 
3.2 PROPOSED SCHEME:
The proposed scheme is Hop count Sensitive Probabilistic Packet Marking. In this 
approach marking of the packets is carried out based on the hop count where by the 
router overload is minimized without compromising on the speed of detection. Each 
router has a buffer as in [8]. When ever packet enters the network the ingress router 
marks the packet, stores the packet information in to the buffer, remarks the packet with 
its information and forwards the packet. Each packet has a hop count field. When the first 
router in the network marks the packet it sets the hop count field as one. Each router 
along the path increases the hop count field. The packet is marked by the method 
discussed earlier. That is, when the router decides to mark the packet it marks based on 
some constant marking probability.
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 When number of hops traversed by a packet is greater than threshold then the method of 
marking is carried out by the following. The marking probability is calculated as 
                                                  )(dfp 
Where ()f  is the monotonically increasing function of d,
 p is the marking probability,
and d is the hop count.
So routers after the threshold are going to mark the packets. When the router marks the 
packet it stores the previously marked information in its buffer and remarks the packet. 
The marking probability is going to increase with each hop. The trace back is carried out 
same as in Pipelined Probabilistic packet marking [8]. The marked router information is
sent through the packets that are heading to the same destination. 
3.2.1 ADVANTAGES:
Earlier approaches have a constant probability of marking, so the router overload is going 
to increase if the marking probability is high. Also if the marking probability is low then 
the time taken for trace back process is high, because the number of routers along the 
attack path that are going to mark the packets are going to be less. Hence this leads to 
increase in number of packets to get the trace. In order to reduce the router load and 
increase the time taken for trace back process this scheme of having variable marking 
probability based on hop count is of great advantage. Another advantage is that most of 
the critical websites takes more than 15 hop counts shown in figure 9, also the general 
internet takes less than 10 hops shown in the figure 8; therefore the proposed Hop count 
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Sensitive Probabilistic Packet Marking will enable faster detection of Dos attacks on the 
critical websites without overloading the Internet routers.
                              Figure 8: General Internet Traffic (reproduced from [23])
This figure below shows the hop count distribution of popular websites namely 
yahoo.com and Stanford .com. The distribution shows that it takes more than 15 hop 
count in order to get access to those sites.
24
                      Figure 9: Internet Traffic for Popular sites (reproduced from [24])
3.2.2 SIMULATION:
The simulation is carried out in C language. The assumptions that are made during 
simulation are as follows the network topology that considered is Line, the attack length 
is 15, threshold is 10 and number of attackers is 50.In the simulation the performance are 
studied for following categories. 
Case i:
The marking probability with number of packets and router overload are measured. In 
this the number of packets to get the complete path is less compared to the existing 
schemes (as shown in the figure 10) this makes the faster scheme for detecting DoS 
attack, also the router overload looks more in the proposed scheme but it is low for that 
particular speed. The performance graph is shown in the figure 11.
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Tracking speed with respect to marking 












































                                Figure 10: Tracking speed with respect to Marking Probability.
            
Router overload with respect to Marking probability 






















                                  Figure11: Router Overload with respect to Marking Probability. 
In proposed scheme the speed of detection is Sp and the speed of detection in existing 
scheme is Se. Also it is found that Sp < Se. And from the figure 11 it is found that If Op 
is the router overload for proposed scheme and Oe is the router overload for the existing 
scheme then Oe < Op. If we need to achieve the speed (i.e. Sp= Se) then from the figure 
10 and figure 11 we can see that the router overload is more in existing than in proposed, 
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(i.e. if the router overload of the increasing speed in existing scheme is ΔOe then ΔOe 
>Op).Hence the proposed scheme gives the Faster detection also with less router 
overload.
Case ii:         
The performance studies are Number of packets with the number of attackers and Router 
Overload with Number of attackers. The performance is good because as the number of 
attacker is going to increase the performance also going to increase as per the above two 
graphs. The two graphs are shown in figure 12 and figure 13 below.
                  









































                             Figure 12: Tracking speed with respect to Number of attackers.
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                        Figure 13: Router overload with respect to Number of attackers.
Case iii:
The final performance is studied based on the proportion of attackers with number of 
packets to get the trace and router overload. The proportion is divided, based on the 
general internet traffic and the performance is good compared to the existing scheme. The 
performance is shown in figure 14 and figure 15. 
                  




























                     Figure 14: Tracking speed with respect to Proportion of attackers.
28
             
              






















                Figure 15: Router overload with respect to Proportion of attackers
The same sets of experiments are going to be carried out in future with different 
probability function and performances are going to be studied.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS
The approach was implemented with various set of functions and hop-counts to compare 
the number of packets required to get the trace and the router overload. The results from 
the simulation are shown in the graphs. From the graphs shown the proposed approach is 
of high advantage with less number of packets to get the trace and the router overload for 
that speed of detection is much less than the existing schemes. As a future work, 
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